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BOOK REVIEWS
GOVERmENT FINANCE. By Jensen, Jens P. Thomas Y. Crowell
Co., 1937. Pp. xxxii, 595.
TAxABrLu INcomE. By Magill, Roswell. Ronald Press Co., 1936.
Pp. ix, 437.
During recent months several able works on public finance have
been published. The observation applies not only to legal but also to
economic literature. The two works under review represent examples
of the best. Jensen deals with social, especially economic, phases of
his subject matter largely to the exclusion of emphasis on legal aspects.
On the other hand Magill is concerned mainly with legal and only incidentally with the economic and accounting sides of the problems he
attacks. Again, Jensen is concerned with a synthesis of the entire
field of public finance; whereas Magill is concerned with a monographic
attack on a comparatively narrow area. It must be said, however,
that both writers exhibit consciousness of the considerations with
which they do not greatly concern themselves. This is more than can
be said of some earlier writers on similar subjects.
More perhaps than any other American text writer among economists concerned with public finance, Jensen devotes special care to
making his work not only systematic but also readable. Both in his
earlier general book published in 1924 and in the present work, he
maintains an easy style sharply in contrast with that of some of his
contemporaries. His organization is comparatively orthodox; although
he does introduce certain departures including more elaborate consideration of income taxation, more attention to interjurisdictional tax
problems, more emphasis on tax administration, and minor variations
of other sorts. Although Jensen is sometimes careless with his facts
(as for instance in his confusion at page 379 of the Kentucky three
per cent gross-receipts tax and the gross sales tax of 1930) and he has
utilized terminology not common in literature of government finance,
he has written perhaps the best general work on the subject for the
reader, such as the practicing lawyer, who has only a general interest
in the subject. His book should be one of the most popular college
texts in general public finance.
Professor (now Undersecretary) Magill is one of the half dozen
students of the law of taxation who knows enough about the intricacies of economics and accounting to discuss the law of income taxation as it has developed in this country without seeming to the economist frequently to miss the point. He is one of perhaps two of these
students who has had enough experience with actual administration
and legislation to appreciate the many practical problems involved in
the subject matter with which he deals. At any rate his Taxable
Income is at once a monument to his scholarly competence and a
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credit to his understanding of practical issues remote from the underlying legal theory. The scope of the work is narrow; numerous
practical problems relating to the definition of income for tax purposes
remain unsolved so far as this study is concerned. Included are
"Part I-The Requirement of Realization," "Part II-Characteristics
of Income," and "Part III-The Source of Payment." As suggested
by the language, the Part I deals with the idea that gains must be
realized before they are legally income under the federal definition.
It may be remarked parenthetically, however, that the courts have not
seen fit to apply this general concept to the treatment of inventories.
In Part II the principal issues considered are whether the discharge of
a taxpayer's obligations constitute income to him, whether payments
of amounts to others pursuant to taxpayer's orders constitute income
to him, and whether the term "income" as used in the Constitution
of the United States means gross receipts, gross income, or exclusively
net income. Part III deals largely with the treatment of certain
types of capital transfers and with the general conclusions of the
author.
Professor Magill's book constitutes the first report on the definition
of taxable income, a study undertaken jointly by law and economics
students at Columbia University. Other material will subsequently
be presented by Professor R. M. Haig, Professor Carl Shoup, and Professor Paul H. Wueller (the last of Pennsylvania State College). It is
anticipated that the subsequent reports will deal with accounting and
economic aspects but that they will be prepared in close cooperationif not collaboration-with scholars in the field of law.
JAMSS W.

MARTIN,

Commissioner of Revenue, Commonwealth of Kentucky.

HANDnOOX OF THE LAW OF Wmts. By Thomas E. Atkinson. West
Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minn., 1937, pp. vii-916.
This is a well written discussion of the more general problems
arising from testamentary succession. The book deals, likewise, with
the history of succession, intestacy, limitations upon succession, substitutes for wills, as well as with capacity, execution, fraud and mistake, integration, revocation, republication, probate and contest, and
administration. Many subjects are handled rather briefly, inasmuch
as the book is intended rather for law students than for lawyers.
One might criticize the author's theory of that most confusing
device, the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. It was mentioned in the earliest edition of Powell on devises in 17S8 and the
original author of it envisaged two acts, one a dependent act (the
revocation of a will by cancellation) and the other a relative act (a
supposed substitute for the will). The substitute proving ineffective
it was declared that the dependent act (the revocation by cancellation)
was conditioned in the mind of the testator upon the efficacy of the
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relative act (the substitute will), and so the revocation should fail
The weakness of this doctrine is that the revocation must fail if the
doctrine is rigidly applied whether or not the clear intent of the
testator would thus be violated. It is clear that the English writers
limited the doctrine to revocation by act to the document (cancellation), thus refusing to apply it where the revocation was by subsequent
writing only.
The author, however, does not think of the doctrine as involving
two related acts necessarily, but rather he contemplates the case where
the testator has revoked his will while laboring under a mistake as
to the existence of a situation and believes that the court should declare
the revocation absolute or void, depending upon which the testator
would probably have preferred. His language seems broad enough to
include all revocations made under a mistake. In England revocations
are generally inoperative when made under the influence of mistake.
At least one American case holds that such a revocation is operative.
The application of dependent relative revocation seems to require
mistake, dependent act, and relative act, as well as an inquiry with
respect to the testator's probable wishes and intent. Revocation by
subsequent will well executed but ineffective to dispose of property
seems excluded because if the later will does not, by express declaration or by inconsistency, remove the property from the terms of the
first will, it does not revoke the first will. Possibly this doctrine
might be applicable' where the terms of the so-called revocation are
inconclusive. But even here is it not better to presume that the prior
will is not revoked unless such intention is clearly stated?
In his discussion of Fowles Will [222 N. Y. 222, 118 N. E. 611
(1918)] the author takes the view that a will non-existing at the time
but subsequently executed, can be incorporated into a prior will, rather
than the view that such will is as to the prior testator, a non-testamentary act. This view involves a violation of the doctrine of incorporation by reference and an overthrow of the New York rule against
incorporation by reference. It also conflicts with the expressed view
of the New York court, speaking through Mr. Justice Cardozo.
These are but minor criticisms of a treatise which is well written
and shows that thought and reason have been applied in the confection
of it. This is an excellent single volume on the subject.
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CREDIT TnANACTIONS. By
Wesley A. Sturges. Second Edition. St. Paul, Minn. West Publishing Co. 1936. Pp. xiii, 1082.
Professor Sturges has emphasized "materials" in his second edition,
incorporating a great many new forms, many of which are being
used by the "New Deal" financing organizations, the Farm Credit
Administration, the H. 0. L. C. and the Resettlement Administration;
and also taking bodily a very great number of notes and comments on
recent cases from the various law reviews. Whether one will like the
new edition better than the old will depend to a certain degree upon
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whether he prefers textbook materials to cases for class work. There
are also many more questions found in the notes of the new volume.
The course on credit transactions has already replaced the courses
on suretyship and mortgages in many schools; and has proved superior
to these separate courses. It also gives the subjects of conditional
sales, trust receipts and pledges the importance their use in present
day mercantile transactions warrants. The editor has worked out a
better co-ordination of these subjects by his selection of cases in his
second edition. Those insisting that modern cases be used will find
here thirty-five or forty decided since the first edition was sent to
press.
As the editor points out in his preface, practically the same arrangement is followed in the second edition as was adopted in the first.
Two exceptions to this statement will be found; a sub-section, entitled
"By Special Execution" is included under the section on Enforcement
Proceedings and Right to Redeem; and a new section on the appointment of receiver.
The reviewer has found the first edition a first class casebook, one
of the best, and he expects to find the new edition an even better
instrumentality for putting the subject across to his classes.
W. L-wrs Ronmirs.

University of Kentucky,
College of Law.
EQuITY, By F. W. Maitland.
bridge, 1936. Pp. vi-343.

Cambridge University Press, Cam-

The first edition was published in 1909. It was reprinted many
times, the last appearing in 1932. The lectures on Forms of Actions
are omitted in the new edition. There have been some additions to
the footnotes, e. g., Restrictive Covenants and Trusts. Maitland's
views on equitable rights as rights in ersonam, and not in rem are
reproduced. It seems unfortunate to find no reference to the American
Restatement. A large part of the book is occupied with trusts and
only some twenty-five pages are devoted to specific performance and
injunctions. Two lectures deal with the administration of assets.
AmAioA PRIsoNs. By Blake McKelvey.
cago Press, Chicago, 1936. Pp. ix-242.

The University of Chi-

This brief treatise is the first thoroughgoing review of a subject
of growing interest as the subject of penology comes more and more
to the fore. The table of contents indicates ten chapters, which deal
with the origin of prisons (not in antiquity, however), the coming in
of new theories with respect to the function of punishments, the reform
movement, and the inter influences of Europe and America, convict
labor, reforms, penal developments in the South and West, the Auburn
system and its passing. The student of penology will want this book
for the development of the background.

78
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AmEBiCAN
CoNsTrrUTIoNAL LAW.
Charles
Prentice-Hall, New York, 1937. Pp. v-742.

W.

Gerstenberg.

The book is intended for students who have relatively little time
to devote to constitutional law, according to the preface. It is a combination of treatise (pp. 1-277) and casebook (pp. 281-717). As should
be expected, the book deals only with the larger aspects of constitutional law and not with details. The treatise part seems reasonably
accurate and most of the cases are well chosen. It would seem to be
well adapted for a rapid review of fundamentals for students about to
-take bar examinations. On page 29 the writer says: "This (various
mentioned powers) does not mean, however, that the federal government possesses a general power over matters which are national in
scope and with which the states are unable to deal because of the
nature of the problem involved." Intelligent laymen can use the book
profitably.

